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Introduction: a new geopolitics for 
learning?
One of the most provocative ideas to emerge in recent 
years has been Alan Scott’s (2001) central claim that a 
new meta-geography of global city-regions is steadily 
coalescing in the world.  Exactly what Scott means by this 
notion of the city-region is still elusive, though. As far as 
I know, we do not yet possess a comprehensive typology 
of its multiple and surely fast-mutating spatialities.  The 
concept seems to apply to dozens of urban areas impacted 
quite differently by globalization: viz. to the intra-national 
urban networks of Greater Zurich or the Randstad (Sassen, 
2001); to the inter-national networks of the Yellow Sea 
Cooperation Zone (Friedmann, 2001); and finally to the 
“areal city-regions” of Cape Town and Puget Sound, each 
relatively contiguous, if highly uneven, physical fields of 
roughly three million people that occupy my central atten-
tion later in this paper.  
Despite this ambiguity, Scott’s central claim is fascinating 
because it amounts to a new and potentially radical geo-
politics capable, at least in theory, of nurturing a number 
of important projects (cf. Agnew 2002). Most profoundly, 
if for the moment least likely in the post-9/11 era, a 
global future progressively characterized and motored by 
city-regions might actually offer something liberating to 
those sceptical of, hostile to, or suffering from, the puta-
tive benefits associated with membership in the territorial 
(i.e. genetically Western) state, which arguably has worked 
rather poorly in a majority of those zones upon which it 
has been aggressively grafted (including much of Africa 
and the Middle East) [Footnote 1].
But there is also a more immediate project opened up by 
Scott’s geopolitical imagination – one that I wish to refer-
ence here at the outset.  By challenging our older con-
ception of a core-periphery hierarchy à la world systems 
theory with a flatter geography of imminent, experiment-
ing, city-regions, he also challenges the spatial direction of 
learning.  Instead of a world where an “advanced” North – 
ahead in time and thus ahead in space – teaches through 
diffusion a “trailing” South, Scott’s geopolitics suggest that 
lessons can, should and increasingly will come from most 
anywhere.  On this reading, “Southern” city-regions like 
Cape Town might actually have lots of lessons to teach 
“Northern” city-regions like Puget Sound, if only we can 
adopt an analytical posture that suggests such a develop-
mental possibility for urban learning.  This is not to argue 
that the reverse is no longer true. One need only consider, 
for example, urban South Africa’s rather frenzied interest in 
Business Improvement Districts (originally a Canadian idea 
that like basketball the Americans re-engineered, picked 
up and ran with). But it does suggest that we spend much 
more time thinking about the distinctive modernities and 
institutional experimentations of the erstwhile South, espe-
cially where these emerge in urbanized spaces – long the 
epicentres of “newness” in the world (Jacobs 1969). 
This is my main intention here.   I ultimately interrogate the 
post-apartheid era in Cape Town (1994-2000) in terms of 
the local governance lessons this era might have for the 
contemporary institutional situation in “Puget Sound,” a 
city-region that is quite literally at the opposite end of the 
world but that, nonetheless, shares some commonalities 
with Cape Town.  However, before I discuss Puget Sound 
and Cape Town in the main body of the paper I first lay 
out the idea(1) of the city-region, focusing in particular 
on the re-scaling of politics that this new spatial formation 




Here the reader might also consider the interesting essay on 
global city-regions by one of North America’s more unusual 
politicians, the Canadian separatist Lucien Bouchard (2001), 
who sees this concept from the perspective on an aspiring (ur-
ban) Quebec.
Theoretical considerations: city-regions 
and the “re-scaling” of politics?
The consolidation of the (European) nation-state un-
doubtedly constitutes one of the crucial developments 
in world history. Like many developments, though, some 
now believe that the nation-state carries within itself the 
strange logic of its own demise.  In particular, the global 
world that nation-states have helped to occasion over the 
past several decades may be, paradoxically, “hollowing 
out” these same states (Guéhenno 1995) This is true for 
even powerful nation-states like the USA, whose neo-lib-
eral rationalities have actively legitimated and normalized 
this process. In particular, the rise of supra-national insti-
tutions, especially the EU, has led a number of authors 
to re-consider the actual and potential relevance of new 
scales for effective governance, social regulation and 
political identity.  On this reading, new “post-national” 
geographies of various kinds are slowly emerging – and 
more than that should emerge (Omae 1995).
The “city-region,” forged mainly out of the economic 
benefits associated with specialized, post-Fordist, indus-
trial clustering (viz. increasing returns to scale, untraded 
interdependencies; trust; and so on), is one such geog-
raphy (Storper and Scott 1986); (Gordon and McCann 
2000). Again, Alan Scott has been especially assertive in 
drawing theoretical attention to the economic importance 
of city-regions, particularly those he considers “global”; 
but he is not alone.  A fresh literature on “polycentric 
urban regions” (PUR) highlights similar themes, even as 
most PUR authors acknowledge the importance of earlier 
work by Jean (Gottman 1961), Alan (Pred 1977) and 
(Friedmann and Miller 1965) that relates to what the lat-
ter authors dubbed “the urban field.”  
PUR scholars move beyond the mono-centric models of 
industrial (sub-) urbanization. However, as (Kloosterman 
and Musterd 2001) observe, “…concrete operationalisa-
tions of polycentricity turn out to be rather diverse.” Map-
ping “polycentricity” – getting a sense of its “emerging 
forms” (Simmons and Hack 2000) -- is complex because, 
amongst other things, “polycentricity” means different 
things to different people.  It is economic and physical, but 
also cultural, social and political. This creates the need 
for cross-disciplinary research and collaboration, which is 
easier said than done (Kloosterman and Musterd 2001).  
As a result, there is no single “Chicago-like” map that 
essentializes the city-region. But there is arguably a meta-
logic or at least a rough grammar to these new spatial 
formations, which like Latin syntax can spawn a myriad of 
different manifestations, a “family resemblance” of ur-
ban landscapes.  In charting the differences between the 
global city and the global city-region, for example, Peter 
(Hall 2001) identifies six seminal spaces, though many of 
these do not apply to Kinshasa or Puket: (1) the traditional 
downtown center, increasingly embellished to accommo-
date global tourism and cultural activities; (2) the newer 
business centers of the service economy, often appearing 
in older residential areas; (3) the “internal” edge city, such 
as London Docklands or La Défence in Paris; (4) the “ex-




tion infrastructures; (5) the “outermost” edge city complex 
for back-offices; and (6) specialized (sub)centers, including 
rehabilitated zones for education, sports or theatre. 
Extending his earlier work, John Friedmann (2002) takes 
this analysis even further. He draws on the scholarship of 
Klaus Kunzmann to chart an emerging “spatial structure of 
the European city-region in the 1990s.”  This spatial struc-
ture includes many of the nodes identified by Hall, albeit 
with different names, but also a host of other contempo-
rary realms, including “urban backwater space,” which 
suggests a disarticulated “field” more than an articulated 
“node.” Friedmann’s mapping exercise is particularly use-
ful for my purposes here because it is embedded within a 
larger analysis of governance.  For Friedmann, the “pros-
pect of cities” – and here he means all cities – depends 
crucially on the strategic decisions that actors make in 
regards to urban development, i.e. on the politics of city-
regions. Two models are available.
One the one hand, Friedmann argues, strategies may fol-
low a “city-marketing” model.  Here urban development 
per se is taken to be exogenous in origin and thus neces-
sarily focused on attracting external capital, which will (in 
theory) maximize economic growth and eventually cascade 
down through society via enhanced local job creation. As 
Friedmann puts it: “[b]ecause there is only so much global 
capital to go around…if your city doesn’t latch on to it, 
some other city will: city-marketing is a zero-sum game” 
(p. 21).  The “rules” of this game are familiar -- wage 
suppression; labor force compliance; streamlined local 
administration; tax breaks; subsidized land -- and indeed 
help to produce the “nodes” and “fields” just outlined.  
More, the power base is often shockingly narrow and 
anti-democratic: a tight alliance of trans-national busi-
ness elites and city government officials. In simple terms: 
neoliberalism at the urban scale (Brenner and Theodore 
2002). [Footnote 2] 
In contrast, friedmann argues, there is an alternative, 
much more progressive, strategy for urban development 
In one of the few treatises on neoliberalism at the urban scale, 
Brenner and Theodore add several other “rules,” many of 
which do not emanate with urban elites per se: e.g. disman-
tling of central government support for municipal activities; 
decentralization of welfarist responsibilities; creation of special 
revenue collection districts, etc. (p. 369)
(see also Friedmann 1992).  Interestingly, he calls this the 
“quasi city-state” model, a neo-anarchistic term whose 
bloodlines bind friedmann’s politics to the earlier idea(l)s 
of lewis mumford and patrick geddes, of which more in a 
moment. For friedman, the “relatively autonomous quasi-
city-state” provides a much more effective model for the 
governance of city-regions because just development – my 
term, not his -- is necessarily (1) endogenous (2) collab-
orative and (3) sustainable (p. 23-25). While the sustain-
ability mantra may not stimulate much disagreement, the 
first two are more controversial. 
There are two main reasons why. First, endogenous and 
collaborative development implies that city-regions are, as 
Friedmann puts it, “collective actors” (cf. Tilley 1974). This 
may under-estimate the class, gender and race cleavages 
within city-regions even as it over-estimates the possibili-
ties of placed-based community of any kind, much less 
a progressive community.  This leads to a second main 
concern with Friedmann’s preferred model: it tends to reify 
a sense of “the urban” as a bounded “object” that can be 
managed by “relatively autonomous” local actors.  As Ash 
Amin (2002) puts it: the globalizing city(region) is increas-
ingly “unbounded”; it is not an object per se, but a set of 
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relationships that stretch from, through, and often well be-
yond “the city” as a poly-nucleated physical “thing.” Here 
the city(region) is not a “field” but a “topology,” or more 
properly, a thousand topologies winding their way through 
the everyday performances that hew out the mutable 
urban. The topology metaphor, drawn from actor-network 
theory, suggests a relational (stretched) rather than relative 
(nested) conceptualization of scale.  In my view, there is 
much to recommend this particular conceptualization; it is 
often useful to think of scale in terms of “stretching” lines 
of force rather than nested containers of objects.  However, 
there are serious weaknesses as well: the topology of the 
actor-network in particular gives us only a vague sense of 
politics and normative ethics. Actor-networks often tell us 
what is happening, but not always what is to de done. 
For all its faults, then, Friedmann’s politics are compelling 
because they are tied to an older, if too often neglected, 
tradition in geography and planning: neo-anarchism and 
eco-regional planning. Friedmann’s elevation of “sustain-
ability” in his urban development triptych – his emphasis 
on the foundational notion of wealth creation through 
local-natural as opposed to external- financial capital 
– does not draw explicitly on Mumford or Geddes, but 
the traces of this particular lineage are strong, particu-
larly in Friedmann’s radical interpretation of “planning.” 
Though planning today has a rather technical and nar-
row meaning, it was not always thus. As (Luccarelli 1995) 
documents, Mumford developed Geddes’ hypothesis that 
“evolution” (what we would today call “social learning”) 
occurs through rolling civic participation in the “survey” of 
a region’s resources, possibilities, mythical places, symbol-
ic zones (what Lefebvre (1991) later called the representa-
tional space of radical possibility). 
It is a mistake to dismiss this Geddes-Mumford tradition 
as unworkable in today’s worlds. It informs Pierre Clavel’s  
(Clavel 1985) analysis of the American “progressive city” 
phenomena from 1969 to 1984.  Further, as Martha 
(Bianco 2001) shows, it was Portland’s belated “rediscov-
ery” of Mumford’s (invited) recommendations for regional 
growth and development in 1938  that partly explains its 
contemporary reputation for progressive urbanization and 
environmental stewardship (Development 2000). Central 
to this reputation is Portland’s strong political architecture 
of regionalism, expressed through “Metro,” a regional 
governing and planning institution responsible for services 
to 1.3 million residents in three counties and 24 cities, 
including planning services and land-use information for 
local governments; prioritization and allocation of federal 
and state transportation funds; and business licence co-
ordination. Importantly, Metro has a constituent model of 
governance: citizens are directly represented by an elected 
Council and Executive Director, which gives the body insti-
tutional teeth and constitutes a place-specific accumula-
tion of social capital (Abbot and Abbot 2003). 
Portland aside, the practical importance of a coopera-
tive, sustainable, regionalist approach to Friedmann’s 
“quasi city-state” model lies in the proposition that it offers 
a plausible strategy for dealing with the most pressing 
political challenges of today’s city-regions. According to 
(Warner and Hefetz 2002): 70) these challenges are “…
competitive and overlapping local governments, whose 
political boundaries reflect historical patterns but no 
longer coincide with the social, economic and ecologi-
cal boundaries of the metropolitan area.” In the main, 
regional consolidation of institutional identities – i.e. the 
re-scaling of administrative systems to cohere with extant 
economic space (Bennett 2002) – promises more effective 
management of key urbanization issues: sprawl, ecologi-
cal disintegration, uneven fiscal capacity and concentrated 
poverty (Erkip 2000). Of course public choice theorists 
challenge these apparently intuitive claims, arguing that 
market-based solutions improve implementation efficien-
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cies through service privatisation and/or through inter-
municipal cooperation (the creation of “public markets”). 
Yet even if “private” and “public” markets do improve 
service efficiencies, contract oversight by public authorities 
may mitigate much of these gains. Worse, as (Warner and 
Hefetz 2002) show, market approaches do not build equity 
and voice.  “Markets,” in other words, “do not build com-
munity” (p. 84).
 “Community” is simply a relational effect of shared identi-
ties, including city-regional identities. It is important to note 
that Marxists prefer “consciousness” to “identity” as the 
former suggests the putative priority of class relations in the 
political economy of urbanization.  And certainly “class” 
is crucial in the formation of political loyalties and social 
affinities; but it often merges with a host of other claims on 
human beings, including gender, race and place-based 
claims (Cooke 1985). Within this context, it is plausible 
to argue that the successful formation of a city-regional 
identity is a crucial pre-condition to the collaborative 
(though not necessarily conflict-free) politics of Friedmann’s 
quasi-city-state.  But how does this happen?  Where does 
such an identity come from?  In one sense, these questions 
seem well beyond the parameters of a conference paper.  
But in another sense, they are straightforward. They come 
from simply getting on with things! In their recent analysis 
of the relationship between “regional identity” and the stra-
tegic management and governance of PURs, (van Houtum 
and Lagendijk 2001) getting on with things is fundamen-
tally dialectical: 
PURs develop and position themselves through a process 
of regional identification, in which labelling (‘Randstad’, 
‘Flemish Diamond’) and the setting of common images, 
perspectives and goals play an essential role.  […] A re-
gion will have its own identity if it is different from others in 
terms of its politically induced strategic plans, its believed 
or produced cultural assets [as well as] its functional/mor-
phological dimensions (p. 752). 
Here regional identity emerges through an induced re-
scaling of the political imagination -- through what Lefe-
bvre (1991) theorized as the dominant “moment” in the 
production and stabilization of new spaces: the act of 
representation itself. 
Following Friedmann, then, city-regions possess embryonic 
potential for “collective action” whilst political regionalism 
is the preferred way to unlock this potential (cf. (Calthorpe 
and Fulton 2001). But the dangers are everywhere. “Re-
gionalism” per se can slip quickly into corporate-based 
boosterism rather than civic-driven participation, as 
Philadelphia in the 1990s seems to show. In fin-de-siècle 
Philadelphia, “city-marketing” targeted capital accumula-
tion in (Peter Hall’s) city-regional “nodes”; endogenous 
efforts that targeted (John Friedmann’s) “urban backwater” 
were conspicuously absent. As one businesswoman bluntly 
put it: “Regionalism is not about inner-city guilt or helping 
the poor. It is about being able to compete in the world” 
(Hodos 2002): 372). Accordingly, it is not just the pres-
ence of re-scaled institutions and identities that matters, 
but the constitution and objectives of these institutions and 
identities, a point made quite eloquently by (Pastor and al. 
2000) in their analysis of “regions that work.”  
To recapitulate this theoretical discussion before moving 
on, then, the global emergence of polycentric “city-re-
gions” – now full of heterogeneous spaces -- suggests new 
governance opportunities in the coming decades, opportu-
nities which arguably require a fundamental re-scaling of 
our political capabilities in the service of a more cohesive 
city-regional identity.  Following Friedmann’s analysis, two 
main models are available. The first model is unapologeti-
cally neoliberal and – for this reason – cannot possibly 
promote just urban development (Cox and Watt 2002). 
The second model, rooted in the radical “planning” tradi-
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tions of Geddes and Mumford, argues for an endogenous, 
collaborative and sustainable agenda. Such an alternative 
approach, however precarious and neo-utopian, hypothet-
ically forges an organic sense of place-based identity – a 
regional community for participatory urban development 
and planning. With all this in mind, then, we might fruitfully 
explore the geography and governance experiences of two 
city-regions at the opposite ends of the world: Puget Sound 
and Cape Town – eventually interrogating how the former 
might learn from the latter as both search for new urban 
development strategies. 
Post-Fordist Puget Sound:  urban geog-
raphies and governance
Located in the majestic Pacific Northwest, between the 
Cascade and Olympic mountains, “Puget Sound” has 
evolved in recent years into a “city-region”, albeit one 
forged from the steady conurbation of three, historically 
distinct, “cities”: Seattle, Tacoma and Everett (Moudon and 
Heckmann 2000).  Like Cape Town, Puget Sound is home 
to some three million people.  This population constitutes 
60% of the state’s overall population and is predominantly 
white.  That said, like other urban places in America, Puget 
Sound has sizable populations of Latinos, African-Ameri-
cans and Asians. The region awkwardly spans four coun-
ties and seventy odd incorporated municipalities.
To outsiders, “Puget Sound” – and particularly Seattle-
Redmond, where Bill Gates lives -- has an overwhelmingly 
“high-tech” geography.  There is good reason for this: 
from 1995 to 1998, at the zenith of the New Economy, 
local high-tech employment grew twice as fast as the 
national rate  (11.2% to 5.3% per annum, respectively).  
Following (Warner and Hefetz 2002), though, this rapid 
growth produced an economic reality sharply at odds with 
the slower-moving cultural and political institutions of the 
region, of which more below.  As one report put it:
High tech employment is [now the] major force in 
establishing the region as a global  center in a 
rapidly changing world economy. […] And technology 
employment is  rapidly changing the region’s land-
scape. Employment in high technology is scattered  
throughout the region’s four counties, ignoring county 
and city lines and establishing  a truly regional 
presence (Council 1999).
Adding Microsoft, Amazon, Adobe, Starbucks, and 
new biotech companies, amongst others, to the 
famous “Boeing base” – which produced two-thirds 
of the world’s large commercial aircraft in the late 
1990s (Unknown 1997) – has generated rapid de-
mographic growth  (3% more people in the region 
per annum in recent years). Along with sprawl, this 
has generated demands for new kinds of commercial, 
cultural, retail and environmental amenities. Seattle’s 
CBD, for example, has maintained about 35% of the 
city’s jobs (unusually high for US cities), although the 
wider space-economy has also produced plenty of 
“edge space”, including Bellevue, which neatly fits the 
“Edge City” syntax originally identified by Joel (Gar-
reau 1991). Still other spatial transformations of note 
include the re-engineering of downtown Tacoma, an 
older industrial port city in the Southern part of the 
region.  In the late 1990s, Tacoma invested a billion 
dollars of public and private money. Significant proj-
ects have included a branch campus of the University 
of Washington, a waterfront esplanade, two major art 
museums, a light-rail line, new condo/apartments, 
and a convention center/hotel complex – a “culture-
led”/”leisure space” strategy of urban renewal many 
US downtowns have tried in recent years (Strom 
2002). 
The high-tech luster has faded somewhat in the current 
economy, although the writing was already on the wall 
before 9/11. In March 2001, for example, Boeing an-
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nounced that it would relocate its corporate headquarters 
to Chicago, sending fears that aerospace jobs -- and their 
3.14 multiple effect -- would follow in the coming years. 
The “Boeing bomb” was widely interpreted as a wake-up 
call, particularly in the popular press. The region, it is in-
creasingly suggested, can no longer take itself for granted. 
In particular, problems associated with rapid, post-Fordist 
urbanization – especially transportation chaos – are con-
sidered potential “death-blow” challenges. Recent articles 
in the mainstream press compare Seattle/Puget Sound 
negatively with Vancouver and Portland.  As one reporter 
commented: 
With our Space Needle and sports teams, Pike Place 
Market and gorgeous geography, Boeing and Micro-
soft, Starbucks and Amazon, Seattle likes to think of 
itself as top dog in the Pacific Northwest.  But when 
it comes to liveability we seem stuck in first gear. […] 
Just ask around. “I think Seattle’s in big trouble,” says 
Gordon Price, a city councilor in Vancouver. “There’s 
no fallback except having to live with congestion” 
(Dietrich 2/3/02).
Notwithstanding the journalistic hype, the concern that 
“Seattle’s in big trouble” directly challenges external 
assumptions about Puget Sound.  One of these assump-
tions is that, in the governance arena, the region has 
a “progressive model” from which others might learn. 
The reasoning is three-fold.  First, as a result of the 
1991Growth Management Act (GMA), Puget Sound’s 
counties and municipals have all successfully drafted 
comprehensive development plans. These plans will re-
inforce existing activity centres, and thus help to implode 
growth within the region’s urban growth boundary – “the 
ring around the region” celebrated by Planning. Second, 
Puget Sound has formed a four-county regional transit 
authority – SoundTransit – that will inexorably reinforce 
new development within this “ring” and wean the region 
off the automobile Third, regional management is formally 
abetted by the Puget Sound Regional Council, a council of 
governments that brokers information and provide institu-
tional coordination between jurisdictions. However, there 
are three major signs that things are not as rosy as all this 
suggests.  
First, despite the comprehensive planning mandate, gover-
nance relationships between municipals and counties and 
as well as between municipalities within and across coun-
ties remains competitive rather than broadly collabora-
tive.  Part of this relates to classic land-use politics: in one 
ex-urban case, for example, a lengthy community planning 
process was nearly torpedoed by the Master Builders As-
sociation.  A more significant factor, though, is the uncom-
fortable new political culture of scale, i.e. of simultane-
ously nesting and cross-linking “community plans” into the 
much wider spatial agendas of regional growth manage-
ment.  This was apparent in a “Safe Haven” forum orga-
nized recently by the University of Washington, Tacoma 
and Pierce County Planning and Land Services. [Footnote 
3] During the forum, citizens-volunteers involved in plan-
ning elaborated on their perceptions of the overall pro-
cess.  One volunteer noted she was from the mental health 
This forum, moderated by the Director of the Urban Studies 
program at the University of Washington, Tacoma, was held on 
the evening on February 13, 2003.  The purpose of the forum 
was to unpack the difficulties associated with municipal-County 
relations.  At a working lunch held before the forum, the Direc-
tor of Planning for Pierce County wondered how to reduce 
conflict. I suggested that, given the development models we 
have, conflict is unavoidable -- why not start with the presump-
tion of conflict? The Director responded this way: “I have never 
thought about approaching things like that before; perhaps 





field, “which has proven useful.”  Another reported that he 
had long experience in public issues but “there was a little 
less room for maneuver than we all thought.”  Still another 
noted that she felt most disappointed “anytime we had to 
deal with other jurisdictions.”  An elderly woman concurred 
and added that, though the process kept her hopeful, “I’m 
not convinced we’re building a real community here.”  
Finally, the forum received a thoughtful denouement: “This 
kind of planning,” the participant intoned, “is new in our 
history. It’s antithetical to our American values – to our 
rugged individualism. But we have to think about the Earth 
itself.”    
Second, and related to the first point, Puget Sound has 
proved profoundly unable (so far) to wean itself off the 
private automobile; in consequence, it has the third worst 
congestion problems in the country. About 65% of indi-
viduals work outside the community in which they live. Yet 
efforts to promote regional transportation confront political 
parochialism and pro-car initiatives almost daily.  To cite 
but one example, officials in Renton, an important com-
munity in Puget Sound, stalled the sale of a small parcel 
appraised at only $30,000 to Burlington Northern Santa 
Fe Railway in June 2002.  The railway, whose tracks carry 
the “Sounder” commuter trains between Tacoma and Se-
attle, needed the land for safety improvements. The Mayor 
wanted the tax money for “local” issues.  
Finally, and flowing out of the first two points, despite the 
urgent need to construct a supra-local political identity, 
to embrace the Geddes/Mumford tradition of regional-
ism outlined earlier in this paper, municipal incorporations 
have actually increased in the 1990s, the putative decade 
of regional growth management!  Indeed, new “cit-
ies” – if that is the right term -- appear almost every year, 
even though “…the proliferation of jurisdictions …greatly 
complicates regional management as intended by the 
plans” (Moudon and Heckmann 2000). More, these new 
(suburban) “cities” often occlude affordable housing goals 
through exclusionary zoning practices, which Moudon and 
Heckman (Moudon and Heckmann 2000) identify as Puget 
Sound’s hidden “Achilles heal.”  Indeed, they ultimately 
argue that Puget Sound can only avoid “Los Angelization” 
– the spatial specter that seems to haunt both Puget Sound 
and Cape Town -- if  “… the concept of Cascadia evolves 
into a physical and economic reality”  (p. 133).
Why, then, is the region “stuck in first gear”?  Why is the 
re-scaling opportunity stalled?  While such questions de-
serve a great deal more thought – and empirical evidence 
-- than I can provide here, one hypothesis does seem to 
fit the facts: Puget Sound is in trouble because most of its 
communities have adopted Friedmann’s “city-marketing” 
model of urban development, where wealth is “invited in” 
through strategies for global “competitiveness” and “entre-
preneurial” governance.  On this reading, it is unsurprising 
that Puget Sound as a whole labours to construct sustain-
able regionalism with unsustainable neoliberal tools.  By 
emphasising “competitiveness” in particular it undermines 
the rationalities of “collaboration” – and ultimately of the 
new communities of affection that Friedmann’s “quasi-city 
state” model demands.  The question, then, is not whether 
“Cascadia evolves into a physical and economic reality.”  
In fact, that has already happened, partly for the reasons 
Alan Scott et al. have begun to elaborate.  The question 
is whether a new political reality – a re-scaled progres-
sive regionalism -- can “grow over” and successfully 
govern this physical and economic reality.  It is precisely 
here, I shall positively argue, that Puget Sound might look 
to post-apartheid Cape Town for interesting lessons. But 
Cape Town itself struggles with the spatial manifestations 
of competitive neo-liberalism. Here too there is a lesson 
, although it is hardly a positive one.  Two lessons, then: 
one negative and one positive.  Let me conclude the paper 
with a brief elaboration of these lessons, using Cape Town 
emerging spatialities as the platform for this discussion. 
Learning from Cape Town’s spatialities?
H
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Located near the Cape of Good Hope, alongside the 
place-defining majesty of Table Mountain, “Cape Town” 
might also be conceived as one of South Africa’s three 
(global?) city-regions (Simmons and Hack 2000): 5).  
Today it is home to about three million people, the major-
ity of whom are identified locally as Coloured rather than 
African, Indian/Asian or white. Built up like Puget Sound 
from an original maritime function, Cape Town’s geog-
raphy nonetheless mostly reflects (1) apartheid; and (2) 
economic globalisation, particularly global tourism.  Map 
1 below charts a few of the “spaces” of Cape Town as an 
emerging city-region.  We need not “sugar-coat” this (par-
tial) mapping. For the majority of Cape Town’s residents 
still live in what might be called the space of apartheid 
under-development. This space developed originally from 
the practices attending urban agglomeration, modern-
ist planning and, of course, apartheid ideology itself.  In 
geographical terms, dramatic “buffer zones” separate low-
density, poverty-ridden, housing tracts that are, in turn, lo-
cated far away from major employment centres (including 
the CBD, Claremont and Belville employment “cores”). Af-
rican areas within apartheid space, which were supposed 
to “whither away” with the promulgation of the Coloured 
Labour Preference Area in 1955, simply “wedged through” 
the region, spreading towards the Southeast in ever-larger 
residential swaths punctuated today by “squatterscapes” in 
various stages of consolidation. 
The burgeoning informality of its political, economic and 
physical structure undoubtedly constitutes Cape Town 
most daunting long-term challenge, a reality that needs a 
great deal more research in the coming years (Dierwechter 
2002; 2003).  As (Jenkins and Wilkinson 2001) conclude 
in their recent discussion of this challenge:
In the final analysis…it is probable that Cape Town 
will continue to remain divided into two zones: one of 
relative wealth and formal economic opportunity and 
one of relative poverty, where the informal societal 
order prevails (p._ ). 
While the “informal societal order” may (or may not) be 
a local example of Friedmann’s “urban backwaters,” the 
“economic opportunity” Jenkins and Wilson refer to is 
tied directly to Cape Town’s latest articulation with global 
circuits of wealth creation, especially tourist circuits. The 
ornamentation of Cape Town’s waterfront – its dramatic 
re-production as “leisure space” -- is the most celebrated 
example of this articulation (Kilian and Dodson 1996; 
Goudie, Khan et al. 1999).  But there are other examples 
too, including new gambling zones and the “theme-o-
centric” amusement/business complex at Century City/
Ratanga Junction just off the N1 (Hannigan 1998). The 
latter is a special type of Hall’s “edge space,” the majority 
of which is far less spectacular commercial development 
that, according to Vanessa Watson (Watson 2000), has 
decentralized rapidly in recent years from the three historic 
cores, including the CBD core.  Much of this has mutated 
into “gated space,” joining an even greater number of 
gated residential areas.  For many, this new privatopia and 
surveillance space suggests that Cape Town is emerging 
as a “fortress city,” much like Los Angeles or Sao Paolo 
(Robins 2002).  
This last point runs the grave epistemological risk of any 
mapping exercise (like the above one) that isolates similar 
spaces – global spaces, backwater spaces, edge space, 
leisure spaces, fortress spaces – and then over-generalizes 
their meaning for a whole city.  Amin and Graham (1997) 
call this the problem of synecdoche – of taking the part to 
represent the whole.  At the same time, the simultaneous 
emergence of these spaces – which no geographer can 
possibly ignore -- also provides the basis for our first les-
son.  It is not a positive lesson, but it is, I hope, instructive 
all the same. This lesson relates to the serious limitations of 
the neo-liberal city-marketing model of urban development 
that, I suggested earlier, Puget Sound is also following. 
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Cape Town’s emerging spatialities dramatize these lessons, 
holding them out for others to see in fairly stark form: 
didactic, raw, open.  Simply put, this spatiality reflects a 
house divided: one oriented towards global modernity, 
the other towards apartheid under-development. Fortress 
space emerges as a hopelessly unsustainable “solution” – 
a Mason-Dixon line that staves off the quiet desperation 
of a civil war between two incompatible socio-economic 
tions not neoliberal imperfections. But if it turns out that we 
really do need a flatter geopolitics of global development 
then Cape Town’s spatialities become highly instructive 
for ALL city-regions vigorously pursuing the geography 
of external growth and competitive development.  Puget 
Sound does not have informal squatter camps; it does not 
have the awesome spatial legacies of apartheid ideology.  
However, it does have its own zones of poverty and de-
spair – often in the immediate shadow of its own “theme-
o-centric” cathedrals of leisure and consumption; it has its 
own proliferating Edge and Fortress cities and its own gun 
problem.  In this sense it well might look South – to Cape 
Town -- for images of its own neo-liberal future: a house 
divided that, to stay with the Lincolnian metaphor, cannot 
long stand. 
Yet we cannot end things there.  For there is, I would also 
argue, another epistemology of post-apartheid Cape 
Town, one that does not over-generalize the dualities 
of global modernity and apartheid under-development, 
however important these two realities may be to the story 
of this city.  It is hard to draw maps with this “other” 
epistemology because, as Jenny Robinson suggests, it lies 
somewhere “between” modernity and development – per-
haps in the radical “spaces of representation” that Lefebvre 
(1991) envisaged.  But we can try to locate these spaces 
as best we can, perhaps using traditions of urban thought 
neglected in recent years, such as those associated with 
Geddes and Mumford detailed earlier. When we do so, I 
think Puget Sound might draw much more positive lessons 
from Cape Town’s recent experimentations, especially its 
political experimentations.  For above all else, Cape Town 
has re-scaled its governance structures – and with utterly 
remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, speed (Cameron 
1999).4  Unlike Puget Sound, which suffers from local 
institutional chaos, Cape Town has created a single gover-
[Map 1]
“Spaces” of the city-region Cape Town
systems. On this reading, and following David Harvey’s 
famous analysis of entrepreneurial governance, the ter-
ritorial alliances of a re-scaled Cape Town – appropriately 
re-GEARed -- are over-enthusiastic about exogenous 
development, over-obsessed with the global modernity 
of mobile capitalism, delusional that this modernity will 
diffuse into (rather than rely upon) the space of apartheid 
under-development, over convinced that the “North’s” 
mode of production will eventually win out, however hor-
rific and costly the battle. 
Puget Sound can only dismiss these realities by relying on 
a severely out-dated geopolitical imagination of global de-
velopment, one that tosses Cape Town into the irrelevant 
abyss of the “Third World.”  So done, Cape Town’s spati-
alities of urban neoliberalism are “Third World” imperfec-
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nance realm for the negotiation of its future urban devel-
opment trajectory – for placed-based collaboration about 
the endogenous assets that might be deployed for a more 
sustainable tomorrow.  
This new realm of city-regional governance -- where ad-
ministrative and economic spaces “match up” -- guaran-
tees nothing in itself.  We need to be clear-eyed about this. 
City-regionalism is not genetically “progressive.” As many 
scholars have argued of late, the city-region is a socially 
constructed scale – and thus reproductive of the groups 
who do the constructing (Brenner 2002).  But Cape Town 
has made a start – and it is already possible to see the po-
tentialities of its new governance structure. It has abetted 
innovative projects like the Wetton-Landsdowne-Corridor, 
which Roberts (2002) rightly calls “people-centred space”  
and which might also be theorised as a politically-induced 
representation of socio-spatial integration. Within this 
wider field of action there are even smaller, more ordinary, 
less flashy spaces  – for example, spaces of informal sector 
development -- that drip with the endogenous, collabora-
tive and sustainable potential of the “quasi-city-state” strat-
egies Friedmann celebrates (Dierwechter 2001, 2003).  
And again, while Puget Sound does not have large swaths 
of “informality,” it does have its own distinctive zones of 
neglected people and ignored assets.  Accordingly, in so 
far as Puget Sound must engage with these zones if it is to 
build a just city-region, it may turn to Cape Town for politi-
cal inspiration.  For however submerged and precarious, 
Cape Town’s city-regionalism still retains the potential for 
something organic and true, rather than something im-
ported and imitative. 
Conclusions
In the headquote that opened this paper, I highlighted 
an ordinary, but stinging, critique of Puget Sound’s po-
litical and administrative geographies.  If life does not 
improve in the region, we can expect such critiques may 
grow – perhaps enough to generate a different kind of 
politics.  Following the synoptic theme of this session – 
“Learning from South Africa” – I have argued here that 
“Puget Sound” might look to “Cape Town’s” spatialities for 
strategic insight into such politics.  I initially mobilized Alan 
Scott’s (geopolitical) argument that we pay more attention 
to global city-regions, suggesting that such regions change 
the direction of spatial learning by confronting the “core-
periphery” spatialities of world history.  I then elaborated 
upon the geography of city-regions, drawing not only upon 
the current literature but also upon an older tradition of ur-
ban thought that stretches back to the neo-anarchistic re-
gionalism of Lewis Mumford and Patrick Geddes.  I pulled 
these two literatures together by referencing John Friedma-
nn’s propositions about urban development models -- the 
first neo-liberal, the second regionalist. Through a spatial 
exploration of Puget Sound and Cape Town, respectively, 
I subsequently used these models to highlight two lessons 
for Puget Sound. The first was negative, as it addressed the 
divided spatialities of Cape Town’s urban neoliberalism; 
the second was positive, finding inspiration in Cape Town’s 
remarkable political transformation, which, in my view, still 
retains the spatial possibilities for endogenous, collabora-
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